Competition law and merger control in Argentina

Key rules

1. Prohibited agreements and conduct (Law arts. 1 to 4)

• General clause (art. 1). Agreements between competitors, economic concentrations and acts or conduct relating to the production and exchange of goods or services are prohibited when their object or effect is to limit, restrict, falsify or distort competition or market access, or when they constitute an abuse of a dominant position, in a way that may harm the general economic interest. The article also catches "significant competitive advantages" obtained by breaching other rules.
• Hard core cartels (art. 2). Agreements between two or more competitors whose object or effect is to (a) fix prices directly or indirectly; (b) restrict output or the number, volume or frequency of services; (c) share markets, customers or sources of supply horizontally; or (d) coordinate bids or abstention in tenders, auctions or competitions. These are "absolutely restrictive" practices, presumed to harm the general economic interest, and null by operation of law.
• Other restrictive practices (art. 3). A non exhaustive list that is unlawful only if the art. 1 test is met: price fixing and information exchange with the same object or effect (a); output restrictions (b); limiting technical development or investment (c); excluding or hindering third parties (d); limiting R&D (e); tying (f); exclusivity conditions (g); unjustified discrimination (h); unjustified refusal to deal (i); cutting off a dominant monopoly service to a public service provider (j); below cost sales without commercial justification to displace competitors or damage suppliers' brands (k); and interlocking directorates, meaning one individual holding relevant executive or director posts in two or more competing companies (l).
• Scope (art. 4). All individuals and legal entities, public or private, for profit or not, active in all or part of Argentina, and those active abroad to the extent their acts may produce effects in the national market. Substance prevails over form.
• Exemption permits (art. 29; Regulations art. 29). The Tribunal may by reasoned decision permit agreements containing art. 2 conduct if they improve production or distribution, promote technical or economic progress, give concrete benefits to consumers, contain only indispensable restrictions and do not allow the elimination of competition in a substantial part of the market.

2. Dominance (arts. 5 and 6)

A firm or firms are dominant when they are the only supplier or buyer in the national market or in one or more parts of the world, or, without being the only one, are not exposed to substantial competition, or, through vertical or horizontal integration, can determine the economic viability of a competitor (art. 5). Relevant factors are substitutability (including imports), regulatory barriers and the ability to influence prices unilaterally (art. 6). Dominance itself is lawful; abuse is caught by art. 1 and the art. 3 list.

3. What is a concentration (art. 7)

A concentration is the acquisition of control of one or more companies through: (a) a merger; (b) a transfer of a going concern (fondo de comercio); (c) acquiring ownership or any right over shares, equity or convertible debt that gives control or substantial influence; (d) any other act transferring, in fact or in law, the assets of a company or giving decisive influence over ordinary or extraordinary management decisions; or (e) any act under (c) that gives substantial influence over the competitive strategy of a company. Minority stakes with veto rights over strategy can therefore be notifiable.

Prohibited concentrations are those whose object or effect is or may be to restrict or distort competition to the detriment of the general economic interest (art. 8).

4. Filing threshold and who counts (art. 9; Regulations art. 9)

• Threshold. Combined turnover "in the country" of the affected companies above 100,000,000 UM (art. 9, first paragraph). Only Argentine turnover counts, but sales into Argentina by foreign group companies (exports to Argentina) are reported in Form F0 (Res. 905/2023, Form F0, point 5).
• Turnover means sales of products, services and direct subsidies from ordinary activities in the last financial year, net of sales discounts, VAT and other taxes directly related to turnover (art. 9, fourth paragraph) (unconfirmed).
• Affected companies (art. 9, fifth paragraph): (a) the target; (b) companies the target controls (more than half of capital, votes, board appointment rights, or the right to manage); (c) the acquirers; (d) companies the acquirers control; (e) companies controlled by those in (d); (f) companies jointly controlled by companies in (d) and (e). The Regulations extend (c) up the chain "to the ultimate controller" (Regulations art. 9, second paragraph). The seller and its retained group are not on the list.
• Which UM value. The value in force on the business day before notification; turnover in foreign currency is converted at the BNA selling rate on the closing date of the prior financial year (Regulations art. 9, last paragraph). The Law itself says the Tribunal publishes the peso amount each year using the UM in force on the last business day of the previous year (art. 9, second paragraph). These two rules point to the same figure in most cases, but they can diverge in January, before the new UM is published (unconfirmed).
• Annual publication. Before 31 January each year the Tribunal must publish in the BO the peso amounts of the art. 9 threshold and the art. 11(e) exemption; until it does, the previous year's amounts apply (Regulations arts. 9 and 11). TDC Res. 6/2026 published the 2026 UM value; a separate publication of the peso thresholds was not found (unconfirmed).
• Transfers excluded. Gratuitous transfers to the State, provinces, municipalities, the City of Buenos Aires and forced heirs, inter vivos or on death, are not notifiable (Regulations art. 9, fourth paragraph).

5. Exemptions (art. 11; Regulations art. 11)

Even above the threshold, no filing is required for:

6. Procedure, timing and decisions (arts. 10 and 12 to 17)

• Advisory opinion on whether a deal must be notified, at the request of a party; the decision cannot be appealed (art. 10). It is valid for six months, extendable once; it does not discharge the filing duty (Regulations art. 10).
• Ex officio review of unnotified deals and a summary procedure for deals unlikely to be prohibited (art. 10).
• Public notice. Within five days of a filing, the non confidential information is published on the ANC website and anyone may object (Regulations art. 13, last paragraph; Law art. 13). The ANC is not obliged to rule on objections.
• Decision deadline. Within 45 days of a complete and correct filing, the authority must authorise, authorise with conditions or deny (art. 14). All deadlines are administrative business days (art. 36). If the Tribunal sees potential harm, it issues a reasoned objection report, made public, and calls a special hearing on remedies; the deadline can then be extended by up to 120 additional days, and suspended while the parties answer (art. 14).
• Tacit approval. If no decision is issued in time, the deal is tacitly authorised with the same effects as an express approval (art. 15). The SCE issues a certificate within 10 days of a request (Regulations art. 15).
• Incomplete filings. The Tribunal may treat the deal as not notified if information is incomplete (art. 14). Under Res. 905/2023, if Forms F1 or F2 are incomplete and not justified, the parties get 30 days to fix them and then a final 5 days; the time between filing and the "not notified" declaration counts for the late filing fine (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 4(a)).
• Regulated sectors. If the deal involves services regulated by a national regulator, the regulator is asked for a non binding opinion within 3 days and must answer within 15 days; silence means no objection; the request does not stop the 45 day clock (art. 17).
• Conditions. Conditional approvals set a deadline for compliance; failure leads the Tribunal to order the deal unwound to the pre notification position (Regulations art. 14).
• Lapse. An authorisation lapses if the deal is not carried out within one year of the tacit or express approval (Regulations art. 14).
• False information. Approvals obtained with false or incomplete information can be reviewed and revoked, and the deal treated as not notified (art. 16; Regulations art. 16).

7. The suspensory regime and gun jumping (arts. 9 and 84; Regulations arts. 9 and 84; TDC Disp. 29/2026)

• Permanent rule (art. 9, as it will apply). Notifiable deals must be notified before the earlier of completion of the act or the "materialisation of the taking of control", and they only produce effects between the parties and towards third parties once approved under arts. 14 or 15. Closing in breach, or taking control before Tribunal approval, is sanctioned under art. 55(d), and the parties must reverse the deal if it falls under the art. 8 prohibition (art. 9, third paragraph).
• "Materialisation of control" means any act that, in fact or in law, gives the buyer or members of its control group substantial influence over the target (Regulations art. 9, first paragraph).
• Deadlines by type of deal (Regulations art. 9): mergers, before signing the final merger agreement under LGS art. 83(4); going concern transfers, before registering the sale document under Law 11.867 art. 7; share deals, before the day the acquisition is completed under the purchase agreement; other cases, before completion, before the condition precedent is fulfilled, or before acts of fact that give control.
• Corporate formalities blocked. Notifiable acts cannot be recorded in corporate books, formalised in a public deed or registered with the Public Registry until approved or tacitly approved; deals concluded in breach of art. 9 produce no legal effects (Regulations art. 9). For the share register and LGS art. 215 transfer registration see /guide/entities/sa-sau/.
• Gun jumping information. The parties must refrain from exchanging information that could amount to prohibited conduct (Regulations art. 13).
• Transitional rule (art. 84). Until one year after the ANC started working, art. 9 applies with a different first paragraph: notification "beforehand or within one week" of the earliest of the conclusion of the agreement, publication of a purchase or exchange offer, or acquisition of a controlling interest. The one week runs from signing the final merger agreement, registering the going concern sale, completing the share acquisition, or completing the deal in other cases, and the third paragraph of art. 9 (sanction for closing without approval) does not apply during the transition (Regulations art. 84).
• End of the transition. TDC Disposition 29/2026 states that the suspensory regime enters into force at 00:00 on 17 November 2026 (recital I). It fixes as a general interpretive criterion that deals notified before that moment stay under the transitional, non suspensory regime even if they close later (art. 1), provided the filing is backed by a legally binding agreement signed by persons with sufficient authority that obliges the parties to implement the deal; letters of intent, memoranda of understanding, term sheets and non binding offers do not qualify, but conditions precedent (including foreign or local regulatory approvals) do not affect the binding character (art. 2 and recital III). The criterion works both ways: a deal signed before 17 November 2026 but notified after it is subject to the suspensory regime (recital II). Closing a pre notified deal before a decision remains at the parties' own risk and the authority keeps its art. 14 powers (art. 3).

8. Who files, forms and platform (Regulations art. 9; Res. 905/2023)

• Obligated party. The acquirer, or the merging and merged companies, or their immediate or ultimate controllers; for art. 7(e) deals, the company acquiring substantial influence. Filing is optional for the seller, though the authority may require its participation (Regulations art. 9; Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 7).
• Platform. Forms and attachments are filed on TAD (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 6(a); Secretariat of Domestic Commerce Res. 231/2020, art. 2).
• Forms. Form F0 for every filing (summary procedure, PROSUM, and the start of the ordinary procedure); Form F1 for the ordinary procedure; Form F2 when deeper analysis is needed, due within 30 days of a request (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, arts. 2 and 9). A deal is not considered notified unless F0 and, where applicable, F1 are filed; informal letters do not count (Annex I, art. 3(f)).
• Content of F0 includes: party identification; whether the companies have an integrity programme under Law 27.401 arts. 22 and 23 and a competition compliance programme; the PROSUM criteria relied on; the transaction documents (final version, or latest draft if filed before completion); shareholder agreements; full transcription of non compete, exclusivity, non solicitation and confidentiality clauses; a non confidential summary for the public register; control structure charts up to the ultimate individuals and beneficial owners under Law 25.246 art. 21 bis; balance sheets; Argentine activities by five digit CIIU code; at least two market definitions (one maximising concentration, one based on precedent); three years of market shares; any product above 50% share; filings in other jurisdictions; and the last three years of deals and investigations (Res. 905/2023, Form F0, points 1 to 8). (unconfirmed)
• Language. Documents not in Spanish need translation by an Argentine sworn translator. The authority may waive full translation, but the recitals, object, closing conditions and ancillary restriction clauses of the transaction documents, and the income statement, balance sheet and related party sections of financial statements, must always be translated. Foreign public documents must be legalised or apostilled (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 6(c) and (d)).
• Sworn statement. Everything filed is a sworn statement (Regulations art. 13; Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 3(a)). Missing information must be justified by the board or general management, or by the foreign company's LGS art. 118 representative (Annex I, art. 3(c)).
• Pre notification. Voluntary, informal and confidential contacts are allowed but do not bind the authority (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 8).

9. Summary procedure (PROSUM) criteria (CNDC Disp. 62/2023, Annex I as replaced by Disp. 156/2024)

Deals initially qualify for PROSUM if they are: (a) conglomerate deals; (b) moves from joint to sole control by an existing controller; (c) horizontal deals with combined share below 20% in each affected market; (d) horizontal deals with combined share below 50% and an HHI increase below 150 points; or (e) vertical deals with individual shares below 30% in each vertically related market (art. 3). They are excluded if, among other things, the post deal HHI in an affected market exceeds 2,500, the deal removes a vigorous competitor, combines important innovators, is a "killer acquisition" of a small innovative company, may create portfolio effects, a regulator objects under Law art. 17, or the authority needs more information (art. 4). Parties may file F1 alongside F0 in the alternative, and the authority may still run the case as PROSUM (Disp. 156/2024, art. 2). Disposition 156/2024 applies to filings after its publication (BO 3 Jan 2025); earlier filings continue under Disp. 62/2023 (art. 3).

10. Investigations of conduct (arts. 34 to 54)

• Start. Ex officio or by complaint of any person (art. 34). Complaints are filed on TAD (Secretariat of Commerce Res. 1046/2023, art. 1). Complaints must state the facts, the law and the evidence (art. 37) and the affected markets (Regulations art. 37).
• Steps. Explanations within 15 days (art. 38); decision to open a formal investigation (art. 39); investigation within 180 days of that decision (art. 41; Regulations art. 39); statement of objections with 20 days to answer and offer evidence (art. 41); evidence period of 90 days, extendable by 90 (art. 43); closing briefs within 6 days and a decision within 60 days after them (art. 43; Regulations art. 43).
• Interim measures. At any stage the Tribunal may impose conditions or order cessation to prevent harm; appeal is without suspensive effect (art. 44).
• Commitments. Until the final decision, the accused may offer to cease or modify the conduct; if the Tribunal accepts, the case is suspended and archived after three years of compliance without recidivism (art. 45; Regulations art. 45).
• Dawn raids. The SICA can enter premises with consent or with a court order, which the judge must decide within one day (art. 30(e)).
• Duty to cooperate. Obstruction, failure to supply information or supplying false or misleading information, refusing an inspection or failing to appear is fined at 500 UM per day (art. 59), that is ARS 725,025 per day (about US$464) in 2026. Every information request must transcribe art. 59 (Regulations art. 39).

11. Sanctions (arts. 55 to 59)

Detailed in the penalties table below. The Tribunal grades fines by gravity, harm, benefit, deterrence, asset values, intent, duration, market share, market size, history and economic capacity; cooperation is a mitigating factor (art. 56). Legal entities answer for acts of individuals acting on their behalf (art. 57). Directors, managers, statutory auditors (síndicos), supervisory council members and representatives who contributed by act or culpable omission are jointly liable for the fine, can be disqualified from trade for 1 to 10 years, and liability can reach controlling shareholders (art. 58).

12. Leniency (arts. 60 and 61; Regulations art. 60; Res. 98/2024)

• Who. Any participant in an art. 2 hard core cartel, including conduct abroad that affects Argentina (Regulations art. 60).
• When. Before receiving the art. 41 statement of objections; later applications are rejected outright (art. 60; Regulations art. 60).
• Immunity. First to report and provide evidence, either before any investigation or when an investigation exists but evidence is insufficient; must stop the conduct (unless asked to continue to protect the investigation), cooperate fully, not destroy evidence and not disclose the application except to other competition authorities (art. 60(a)).
• Reductions. Later applicants providing evidence of added value: 20% to 50% reduction of the maximum fine, graded by order of arrival (art. 60(b)).
• Leniency plus. An applicant who does not qualify for immunity in a first cartel but reports a second, different cartel gets immunity for the second and a one third reduction for the first (art. 60(c)).
• Confidentiality and civil damages. The applicant's identity is confidential; courts cannot order disclosure of leniency materials; rejected applications are not an admission and the evidence cannot be used (art. 60(d)). Joint applications by competitors are not allowed, but a company and its own directors and managers may apply together (art. 61).
• Criminal immunity. Successful applicants are exempt from Penal Code arts. 300 and 309 and any prison sanction for anticompetitive conduct (art. 61).
• Damages. Successful applicants may be exempted or have reduced joint liability towards victims, except where victims cannot obtain full compensation from the other cartel members (art. 65).
• Procedure (Res. 98/2024, Annex): anonymous hypothetical enquiries about marker availability, including by email to clemencia@comercio.gob.ar (art. 9) (unconfirmed); written marker request with the minimum content of art. 11 (defects cured within 3 days); admissibility decision within 10 days, not extendable (art. 13); coordination hearing within 10 days of the marker certificate (art. 19); full evidence within 60 days, extendable by 30 (art. 22); preliminary assessment within 20 days, extendable by 20 (art. 25); conditional benefit agreement (art. 27); definitive benefit in the final sanction decision (art. 31).
• Status caveat. Res. 98/2024 approved the leniency rules "until the ANC starts working" (art. 1). The ANC is now working, and no replacement leniency regulation by the Tribunal was found (unconfirmed).

13. Damages and appeals (arts. 62 to 73)

• Victims can sue for damages under general law; a final Tribunal decision is res judicata on the infringement and follow on claims run under the fast track sumarísimo procedure (arts. 62 and 63). Courts may also impose a civil fine in favour of the victim (art. 64). Infringers are jointly liable (art. 65).
• Appeals against sanctions, cease and desist orders, merger prohibitions or conditions, dismissal of complaints, leniency rejections and art. 44 measures (art. 66) are filed with the Tribunal within 15 business days (art. 67). Sanction appeals have suspensive effect only if a surety insurance policy covering the fine is posted; the others, and daily fines, are devolutive (art. 67).
• The Law created a specialised competition chamber within the National Civil and Commercial Federal Court of Appeals (arts. 68 to 71). Until it is set up, that Court of Appeals (or the federal appeals court of the relevant province) hears appeals (Regulations arts. 67 and 71) (unconfirmed).
• Limitation. Administrative actions: 5 years from the infringement or, for continuing conduct, from when it stopped (art. 72). Damages: 3 years from the infringement or from when the victim knew or should have known, whichever is later (art. 72(a); Regulations art. 72), or 2 years from a final sanction decision (art. 72(b)). Interruptions and suspensions: art. 73.

14. The authority

• ANC: decentralised, financially autonomous body (art. 18) composed of the Tribunal (five members, at least two lawyers and two economists, art. 28), the SICA (art. 30) and the SCE (art. 31). Members serve five years, renewable once, appointed after a public competition and with Senate agreement; the Executive may appoint "in commission" while Senate agreement is pending (arts. 20, 23 and 24).
• Constitution. The ANC is legally constituted with the appointment of the President, two Tribunal members and both Secretaries, and starts working immediately (Regulations art. 18, as replaced by Decree 803/2025, art. 1). Decree 810/2025 made those appointments in commission and ordered publication of the candidates' CVs; the Executive "will request" Senate agreement (recitals and arts. 2 to 6) (unconfirmed).
• Transitional authority. From 2018 to November 2025 the Secretariat of Commerce (later Domestic Commerce, then Industry and Commerce) acted as enforcement authority and the CNDC instructed cases (Decree 480/2018, arts. 5 and 6), with powers delegated by Secretariat of Commerce Res. 359/2018. Cases started under the old Law 25.156 continue under that law (Law art. 81; Regulations art. 81).
• Public register. The National Competition Register (Registro Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia) records notified deals within five days and all final decisions (Law art. 28(s); CNDC Disp. 75/2019, art. 3).

15. Sector specific references

• Airlines. The Aeronautical Code art. 110, as replaced by DNU 70/2023 art. 216, states that business agreements with operational impact (code sharing, connection, consolidation or merger of services or businesses) are governed by the Competition Law.
• Regulated services. Regulators give an opinion in mergers (Law art. 17) and must inform the Secretariat of Commerce before resolutions that may affect competition (art. 77).

Brief pointers checked

When a foreign deal needs an Argentine filing

1. Effects doctrine. The Law applies to acts abroad that may produce effects in Argentina (art. 4). A share deal signed and closed abroad is caught if the Argentine turnover of the affected companies exceeds the threshold.
2. No local presence needed for turnover. Exports into Argentina count toward Argentine turnover; F0 asks for them and allows official foreign trade statistics (Res. 905/2023, Form F0, point 5).
3. Indirect control changes. The "object of the transaction" is whatever undergoes a change of control in Argentina, directly or indirectly (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 2). An upstream merger of two foreign parents is notifiable if the Argentine numbers are met.
4. First landing. A single foreign acquirer with no Argentine assets or shares and no significant, habitual and frequent exports to Argentina in the last 36 months, buying a single company, is exempt (art. 11(c)). Groups with any Argentine subsidiary cannot use it.
5. Joint ventures. Creating joint control is a change in the nature of control (Form F0, point 4(d)). Each parent's group is an "acquirer".
6. Minority stakes. Rights giving substantial influence over competitive strategy can make a minority acquisition notifiable (art. 7(e)).
7. Coordination with other jurisdictions. F0 asks where else the deal was filed and the outcome (point 8(c)). The Argentine clock is often the longest; plan the long stop date accordingly.

Cartels and abuse of dominance: what triggers cases

• Cartels. Price fixing, output restriction, market sharing and bid rigging are presumed harmful (art. 2). Information exchanges between competitors are expressly listed (art. 3(a)). Bid rigging can add up to 8 years of exclusion from State supplier registers (art. 55(e)). Trade association meetings are a classic risk area.
• Interlocking directorates. One person on the boards or in senior management of competitors is listed conduct (art. 3(l)); check board appointments in portfolio companies and joint ventures.
• Abuse of dominance. Refusal to deal, tying, discrimination, exclusivity and predatory pricing (art. 3). The authority has used interim measures, for example ordering a messaging platform not to implement a privacy policy update and not to share user data under its new terms, with daily fines under art. 55(d) for non compliance (SCI Res. 492/2021, arts. 1 to 4; extended until the end of the investigation by SCI Res. 224/2022).
• Excessive pricing theories. In 2022 the Secretariat of Commerce instructed the CNDC to investigate consumer goods companies whose 2022 price increases might reflect abuse of dominance (SC Res. 68/2022, art. 1). Outcomes are not in the sources (unconfirmed).
• Infringing other rules. Significant competitive advantages obtained by breaching other laws (tax, labour, regulatory) can be a competition infringement if the art. 1 test is met (art. 1, second paragraph).

Step by step

Step 1. Is it a concentration? Map the deal against art. 7. Ask whether the buyer gets sole or joint control, or "substantial influence" over competitive strategy (veto over budget, business plan, key hires, pricing). Joint ventures, asset deals that carry a business, and moves from joint to sole control are all candidates.

Step 2. Identify the affected companies. Buyer group up to the ultimate controller, target and its controlled companies (art. 9; Regulations art. 9). Ignore the seller's retained business.

Step 3. Compute Argentine turnover. Last financial year, net of discounts, VAT and turnover taxes. Convert foreign currency figures at the BNA selling rate on the financial year end. Use the UM in force on the business day before the filing date. Compare with 100,000,000 UM (ARS 145,005,000,000 in 2026).

Step 4. Check the exemptions (art. 11). Especially the first landing exemption (c) and the de minimis rule (e), including the 12 and 36 month aggregation in the same market. If unsure, consider an advisory opinion (art. 10), which takes time and does not stop the clock on your filing duty.

Step 5. Decide the regime by filing date. If you can file before 00:00 on 17 November 2026 on the basis of a signed, binding agreement, the transitional non suspensory regime applies (Disp. 29/2026). Otherwise, plan for a suspensory filing and build Argentine approval into the conditions precedent and the long stop date.

Step 6. Pre notification (optional). Contact the SCE to discuss content (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 8).

Step 7. Prepare the filing. Form F0 (and F1 if the deal will not qualify for PROSUM, or as a subsidiary filing under Disp. 156/2024, art. 2). Gather powers of attorney with express authority to notify (apostilled), corporate charts up to beneficial owners, financial statements, the transaction agreement and ancillary agreements, sworn translations, market data for three years and a confidentiality request with non confidential summaries.

Step 8. File on TAD. Pay any fee if one has been fixed (unconfirmed). Obtain the filing record; publication on the ANC website follows within five days.

Step 9. Answer requests. Each request for information suspends the 45 day clock until the parties' last answer before the SCE's opinion (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 5(d); Disp. 62/2023, art. 3). Spontaneous filings also interrupt the clock (Annex I, art. 5(g)).

Step 10. Decision. Approval, conditional approval or denial (art. 14), or tacit approval after the deadline (art. 15) with a certificate on request (Regulations art. 15). PROSUM approvals could be issued by the CNDC under the Res. 359/2018 delegation (Disp. 62/2023, art. 5) (unconfirmed).

Step 11. Close and record. Under the suspensory regime, close only after approval; only then record the share transfer in the share register, notarise or register (Regulations art. 9). Implement within one year (Regulations art. 14).

Online or paper: online only, through TAD (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 6(a)).

Costs and timelines

A. Mobile unit values (Law art. 85)

The UM started at ARS 20 and is updated yearly by the INDEC CPI (art. 85). New values apply from the day after BO publication; until then the previous year's value applies (Regulations art. 9; each resolution, art. 3).

The 2026 increase is 31.55% on 2025 (own calculation). TDC Res. 6/2026 does not state the CPI index points used, unlike Res. 21/2025, which used 7,694.0075 points for December 2024 against 3,533.1922 for December 2023 (117.76%) (unconfirmed). The 2027 value is expected after the last business day of 2026 (art. 85).

B. Thresholds and amounts in 2026 (UM ARS 1,450.05)

Percentages: PROSUM 20%, 50% with HHI delta below 150, 30% vertical, HHI ceiling 2,500 (Disp. 62/2023 Annex I, replaced by Disp. 156/2024, arts. 3 and 4). Form F0 asks for any product with share above 50% and structure charts including stakes above 10% (Res. 905/2023, Form F0, points 5 and 7).

C. Penalties (Law art. 55 unless stated)

D. Deadlines

All Law deadlines are administrative business days (art. 36); Res. 905/2023 deadlines likewise (Annex I, art. 5(a)).

E. Timeline of norms

Worked examples

Example 1. Global acquisition with an Argentine subsidiary: is an Argentine filing required?

Facts (hypothetical). A US group ("Buyer") signs on 10 December 2026 an agreement to buy 100% of a German group ("Target") from a private equity seller for a global price of US$2,000,000,000. Target owns an Argentine SAU. Buyer owns an Argentine SRL in an unrelated sector. Both groups also export to Argentina from abroad. All financial years end on 31 December; last closed financial year is 2025. The deal is signed after 17 November 2026, so the suspensory regime applies (TDC Disp. 29/2026, recital II).

Step 1. Concentration. Acquisition of shares giving sole control: art. 7(c).

Step 2. Affected companies. Target and its Argentine SAU (art. 9(a) and (b)); Buyer and all its controlled companies (art. 9(c) to (f)). The seller's other portfolio companies are not counted.

Step 3. Argentine turnover, last financial year (2025), net of discounts, VAT and turnover taxes.

Dollar figures must be converted at the BNA selling rate on 31 December 2025 (Regulations art. 9). That rate is not in the sources; for illustration this example uses ARS 1,563.90.

• Peso turnover: 38,000,000,000 + 52,000,000,000 = ARS 90,000,000,000.
• Dollar turnover: (9,000,000 + 15,000,000) × 1,563.90 = 24,000,000 × 1,563.90 = ARS 37,533,600,000.
• Total: 90,000,000,000 + 37,533,600,000 = ARS 127,533,600,000 (US$81,548,437 at MEP).

Step 4. Threshold. UM in force on the business day before filing: ARS 1,450.05 (TDC Res. 6/2026), so threshold = 100,000,000 × 1,450.05 = ARS 145,005,000,000 (US$92,720,123). Version A is ARS 17,471,400,000 below the threshold: no Argentine filing, even though the global deal is worth US$2 billion.

Version B. Buyer's Argentine SRL had turnover of ARS 72,000,000,000 instead. Total = 38,000,000,000 + 72,000,000,000 + 37,533,600,000 = ARS 147,533,600,000 (US$94,336,978), which is ARS 2,528,600,000 above the threshold. A filing is required unless an exemption applies.

Step 5. Exemptions in version B.

• Art. 11(c) first landing: no, Buyer already has assets and a company in Argentina.
• Art. 11(e) de minimis: both the "amount of the transaction" and the "value of assets located in Argentina" must be not above 20,000,000 UM = ARS 29,001,000,000 (US$18,544,025).
• Argentine assets of the SAU (book value, hypothetical): ARS 25,000,000,000, below the cap.
• Amount of the transaction: if this means the global price, US$2,000,000,000 × 1,563.90 = ARS 3,127,800,000,000, far above the cap, and the exemption fails. If it means the price attributable to Argentina (say US$15,000,000 × 1,563.90 = ARS 23,458,500,000), it is below the cap, and the exemption applies unless Buyer made other acquisitions in the same market worth more than ARS 29,001,000,000 in the last 12 months or more than ARS 87,003,000,000 in the last 36 months.
• The Law does not say which reading applies. Treat this as unsettled. The cautious course is an advisory opinion (art. 10) or a filing.

Step 6. Consequences if filing is required. Under the suspensory regime Buyer must notify and obtain approval before completing the share purchase or taking control (art. 9; Regulations art. 9). If the overlap is conglomerate (no horizontal or vertical relationship in Argentina), the deal initially qualifies for PROSUM (Disp. 62/2023 Annex I as replaced, art. 3(a)).

Cost to do it (version B): possible fee 5,000 to 20,000 UM = ARS 7,250,250 to 29,001,000 (US$4,636 to US$18,544) if and when fixed (unconfirmed); sworn translation of the recitals, object, conditions and restrictive covenants of the SPA and of key financial statement sections; apostilled powers; counsel fees (unconfirmed). Time: 45 business days from a complete filing plus any suspensions; the long stop date in the SPA should allow at least four to six months for Argentina (unconfirmed).

Example 2. Fine computation for a late filing under the transitional regime

Facts (hypothetical). An Argentine group with national consolidated turnover of ARS 150,000,000,000 in its last financial year acquires control of a competitor. The share purchase is completed on Tuesday 3 March 2026. Combined turnover of the affected companies is above the threshold and no exemption applies. The deal was not notified before closing. The group files Form F0 and Form F1 on Tuesday 30 June 2026.

Step 1. Deadline. Under the transitional art. 9 text (art. 84), notification was due within one week of completion of the share acquisition (Regulations art. 84(c)). One calendar week from Tuesday 3 March 2026 ends on Tuesday 10 March 2026. Counting five administrative business days (art. 36) also gives 10 March 2026, as no national holiday fell in that week (unconfirmed).

Step 2. Days of delay. Art. 55(d) counts days "from the expiry of the obligation to notify". From 11 March to 30 June 2026 there are 112 calendar days. If only administrative business days counted, there would be 80 weekdays before deducting national holidays (24 March, Easter and other dates in the period) (unconfirmed).

Step 3. Maximum daily fine. 0.1% × ARS 150,000,000,000 = ARS 150,000,000 per day (US$95,914) (art. 55(d), first criterion). The fallback of 750,000 UM per day (ARS 1,087,537,500) applies only if the turnover criterion cannot be used.

Step 4. Maximum exposure.

These are ceilings ("up to"). The Tribunal grades the actual fine by gravity, harm, benefit, intent, duration, size and cooperation (art. 56), and a voluntary late filing is a natural mitigating factor. If the authority later declares the filing incomplete and "not notified", the period between filing and that declaration is also counted (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 4(a)). The fine is expressed in UM in the decision (Regulations art. 56). Directors and managers who contributed may be jointly liable (art. 58).

Step 5. Same facts after 17 November 2026. If the completion and the late filing happened under the suspensory regime, the art. 55(d) clock also runs "from when control is taken without the prior approval" of the ANC, the acts would produce no legal effects until approval (art. 9; Regulations art. 9), and if the deal were found anticompetitive the parties would have to reverse it and remove its effects (art. 9, third paragraph). Appealing a daily fine does not suspend it (art. 67).

Example 3. Cartel fine ceiling (short illustration)

A distributor took part in a price fixing agreement for 2 years and 7 months. Its turnover in the cartelised products in the last financial year was ARS 20,000,000,000; its group's national consolidated turnover was ARS 60,000,000,000.

• Criterion (i): duration 2 years and 7 months; the fraction above six months counts as a full year, so the multiplier is 3 (art. 55(b)). 30% × 20,000,000,000 × 3 = ARS 18,000,000,000. Cap: 30% × 60,000,000,000 = ARS 18,000,000,000. Ceiling under (i): ARS 18,000,000,000 (US$11,509,687).
• Criterion (ii): twice the illicit benefit, if computable; the higher of (i) and (ii) applies.
• A repeat offender within 10 years: ceiling doubled (art. 55(b)).
• Leniency: immunity if first; otherwise 20% to 50% off the maximum (art. 60(b)), for example 50% × 18,000,000,000 = ARS 9,000,000,000 for a second applicant who obtains the top reduction.

Practical traps

1. The 17 November 2026 cliff. A deal signed but not notified before 00:00 on 17 November 2026 falls under the suspensory regime even if signed months earlier (Disp. 29/2026, recital II). Rushing a filing on a letter of intent will not work: only a binding agreement qualifies (art. 2).
2. Closing at your own risk. Under the transitional regime closing before approval was allowed, but the Tribunal keeps full power to block or condition, and an unwind order remains possible (Disp. 29/2026, art. 3; Law art. 14).
3. Corporate books. Under the Regulations, notifiable acts cannot be entered in the share register, deeded or registered until approved, and acts concluded in breach have no legal effect (Regulations art. 9). Company secretaries and notaries should ask for the Argentine clearance before recording an LGS art. 215 transfer for a notifiable deal.
4. Seller's turnover is excluded, buyer's whole group is included. Up to the ultimate controller (Regulations art. 9). For funds, that can mean all portfolio companies controlled by the same manager.
5. Which exchange rate. BNA selling rate at the prior year end for turnover (Regulations art. 9), not the MEP or the rate on the filing date. With large peso swings, this choice can move a deal above or below the threshold.
6. The de minimis "amount of the transaction" is unclear for global deals (see Example 1). The 12 and 36 month aggregation applies only to deals "in the same market", a term the Law does not define (unconfirmed).
7. Clock suspensions. The 45 day period starts only after powers of attorney are proven, translations are filed and promised information is delivered (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 5(b)). Each request suspends the clock until the last answer before the opinion (Disp. 62/2023, art. 3).
8. Translations of restrictive covenants cannot be waived (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 6(c); Form F0, point 8(b)).
9. Sworn statement risk. Everything filed is a sworn statement; false information can lead to revocation, prohibition and reversal (Regulations arts. 13 and 16).
10. Ancillary restraints are scrutinised. F0 requires full transcription of non compete, exclusivity, non solicitation and confidentiality clauses, with scope, duration, territory and persons bound (Form F0, point 4(b)(v)). Overly broad non competes can attract conditions (unconfirmed).
11. Information exchange during the deal. Gun jumping is not only early closing: the parties must avoid exchanging information that could amount to prohibited conduct (Regulations art. 13). Use clean teams.
12. Personal liability. Directors and managers can be jointly liable and disqualified for 1 to 10 years (art. 58).
13. Appeal costs. To suspend a fine on appeal, a surety insurance policy for the full amount is needed (art. 67).
14. Leniency timing. After the art. 41 statement of objections no leniency is possible (art. 60; Regulations art. 60). Disclosing an intention to apply, other than to other competition authorities, forfeits immunity (art. 60(a)(5)).
15. Legacy rules referring to the "CNDC" and the "Secretariat". Res. 905/2023, the PROSUM criteria and the leniency rules still name the old bodies; how each provision maps to the ANC's organs is not always spelled out (unconfirmed).

Recent changes

• 13 November 2025. Decree 803/2025: the ANC starts working immediately once constituted; the previous 60 day start up period disappears (Regulations arts. 18 and 28 as replaced).
• 17 November 2025. Decree 810/2025: President and two members of the Tribunal, the Secretary of Conduct Investigation and the Secretary of Concentrations appointed in commission.
• 16 January 2026. TDC Res. 6/2026: UM 2026 at ARS 1,450.05, the first UM value set by the Tribunal itself.
• 22 September 2026. TDC Disp. 29/2026: suspensory regime from 00:00 on 17 November 2026; filings made earlier on a binding agreement keep the transitional regime.
• 3 January 2025. CNDC Disp. 156/2024: new PROSUM inclusion and exclusion criteria, including "killer acquisition" and portfolio effects exclusions.
• 25 February 2025. SIC Res. 21/2025: UM 2025 at ARS 1,102.28 (+117.76%).
• 28 May 2024. SIC Res. 98/2024: detailed leniency procedure (marker, coordination hearing, conditional and definitive benefit).

Pending changes

• Filing fee. The Executive has not fixed the art. 33 fee on the ANC's proposal (no fixing norm in Infoleg's list) (unconfirmed).
• 2027 mobile unit. Due after the last business day of 2026 (art. 85); peso thresholds for 2027 must be published before 31 January 2027 (Regulations art. 9).
• Senate agreement for the members appointed in commission, and appointment of the two remaining Tribunal members (Law arts. 23 and 28; Decree 810/2025) (unconfirmed).
• Specialised appeals chamber (arts. 68 to 71) (unconfirmed).
• ANC rules replacing interim instruments: internal rules of the Tribunal (Regulations art. 18), leniency rules (Res. 98/2024 was interim), PROSUM delegation (Res. 359/2018 delegated to the CNDC), merger guidelines (SC Res. 208/2018 is cited by Res. 905/2023 but is not in the sources) (unconfirmed).
• Gun jumping practice. How the Tribunal will compute daily fines (calendar or business days) and treat pre closing integration steps is untested under the suspensory regime (unconfirmed).
• Retail competition bill. The Law created a drafting commission for a retail competition law (arts. 87 to 91); Law 27.545 on supermarket shelves (Ley de Góndolas) appears in Infoleg's list of norms complementing Law 27.442 but was not reviewed for this page (unconfirmed).

FAQ

1. Our deal closed abroad and has nothing to do with Argentina except local sales. Do we need to file? Possibly. The Law covers conduct abroad with effects in Argentina (art. 4), and the threshold counts Argentine turnover of the buyer group and the target group, including exports into Argentina (art. 9; Form F0, point 5). If combined Argentine turnover exceeds ARS 145,005,000,000 in 2026 and no art. 11 exemption applies, a filing is required.

2. Is Argentina now a suspensory jurisdiction? From 00:00 on 17 November 2026, yes (TDC Disp. 29/2026). Before that date, notification could be made up to one week after closing (art. 84). Filings made before the cut off on a binding agreement stay under the old regime even if closing occurs later (Disp. 29/2026, art. 1).

3. What is the mobile unit worth today? ARS 1,450.05 since the day after publication of TDC Res. 6/2026 in the BO of 16 January 2026. It will be updated by CPI after the last business day of 2026 (art. 85).

4. How long does a review take? 45 administrative business days from a complete filing (art. 14), but the clock only starts once powers, translations and promised information are in (Res. 905/2023, Annex I, art. 5(b)) and is suspended during each information request (art. 5(d)). Difficult cases can get up to 120 extra business days after an objection report (art. 14). Silence at the end of the period is tacit approval (art. 15).

5. Is there a filing fee? The Law authorises one between 5,000 and 20,000 UM (ARS 7,250,250 to 29,001,000 in 2026), to be set by the Executive (art. 33). No decree fixing it was found (unconfirmed).

6. What happens if we close without approval after 17 November 2026? A daily fine of up to 0.1% of the group's national consolidated turnover from the day control was taken (art. 55(d)), the acts have no legal effect and cannot be recorded in corporate books (Regulations art. 9), and the deal must be reversed if found anticompetitive (art. 9).

7. Can we get a binding view on whether we must file? Yes, an advisory opinion under art. 10, valid six months and extendable once (Regulations art. 10). It does not by itself satisfy the filing duty.

8. We buy a stake of 30% with veto rights over the budget. Is that a concentration? It can be, if the rights give substantial influence over the target's competitive strategy (art. 7(e)) or decisive influence over management decisions (art. 7(d)). Analyse the vetoes one by one.

9. Are minority directors shared with a competitor a problem? Yes. One person holding relevant executive or director posts in two competing companies is listed conduct (art. 3(l)), unlawful when the art. 1 test is met.

10. What does leniency give us? Full immunity from fines for the first qualifying applicant, 20% to 50% reductions for later ones, a one third bonus reduction for reporting a second cartel, immunity from Penal Code arts. 300 and 309, and possible relief from joint civil liability (arts. 60, 61 and 65). Apply before the art. 41 statement of objections.

11. Can competitors or customers object to our merger? Yes. Filings are published within five days and anyone may file objections; the authority does not have to answer them (Law art. 13; Regulations art. 13). Third parties cannot be parties to the merger file (Regulations arts. 13 and 51).

12. Did DNU 70/2023 or Law 27.742 change competition law? No amendment to Law 27.442 was found in either text or in Infoleg's list of related norms. DNU 70/2023 art. 216 refers airline cooperation agreements and mergers to the Competition Law through the Aeronautical Code (unconfirmed).

13. Can individuals be fined? Yes. Directors, managers, síndicos, supervisory council members and representatives who contributed by act or culpable omission are jointly liable and can be disqualified for 1 to 10 years (art. 58).

Primary sources

• Law 27.442, Competition Law, text (Infoleg)
• Law 27.442, BO data (Infoleg record)
• Decree 480/2018, Regulations, updated text
• Decree 810/2025
• TDC Resolution 6/2026 (UM 2026)
• TDC Disposition 29/2026 (art. 84 transition)
• Secretariat of Commerce Resolution 905/2023 (notification rules, Forms F0 to F2)
• CNDC Disposition 62/2023, updated text
• CNDC Disposition 156/2024
• Secretariat of Industry and Commerce Resolution 98/2024 (leniency)
• Secretariat of Commerce Resolution 359/2018 (delegation to CNDC)
• Secretariat of Commerce Resolution 1046/2023 (complaints on TAD)
• Secretariat of Domestic Commerce Resolution 231/2020 (mergers on TAD)
• CNDC Disposition 75/2019 (National Competition Register)
• Joint Resolution 1/2019 (selection rules)
• UM resolutions: SCI Res. 145/2019
• SCI Resolution 492/2021 (interim measure, messaging platform)
• SC Resolution 68/2022 (consumer goods investigations)
• DNU 70/2023 (art. 216, Aeronautical Code art. 110)
• Law 27.742 (checked for amendments; none found)

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