Bilateral investment treaties and ICSID protection for investors in Argentina

Key rules

1. Where treaties sit in Argentine law (Constitution, arts. 27 and 75(22))

• Congress approves or rejects treaties, and treaties "have a higher rank than laws" (Constitution, art. 75(22)). A BIT approved by law therefore prevails over ordinary statutes, including later ones, as regards the investors it protects.
• The federal government must conduct its relations with foreign powers through treaties that are "in conformity with the principles of public law established in this Constitution" (Constitution, art. 27). Argentina has relied on this public law reservation in the past; the same idea appears in its declaration to the New York Convention (Law 23.619, art. 2, discussed on the Arbitration page). Expect constitutional arguments to be raised at the recognition and enforcement stage (unconfirmed).
• Each BIT is approved by a separate law, which annexes the treaty text. The approving law date is not the entry into force date: entry into force depends on the exchange of notes or ratifications recorded by the Foreign Ministry, sometimes years later (Senegal: approved by Law 24.396 in 1994, in force 1 February 2010).

2. The BIT network: in force, terminated, signed but not in force

The authoritative status source is the Foreign Ministry treaty database. Its record sheet (ficha) for each treaty shows signature date, entry into force, status, approving law, denunciation and termination. On 26 October 2026 it shows:

• 48 BITs in force, all approved by law. 46 date from 1990 to 2002. The newest is the United Arab Emirates agreement (signed 16 April 2018, approved by Law 27.779, BO 21 October 2024, in force 31 October 2024).
• 8 BITs terminated (Belgium and Luxembourg, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, South Africa).
• 6 BITs signed but not in force (Dominican Republic, Greece, New Zealand, Qatar, Japan and the 2026 El Salvador agreement).
• Two MERCOSUR investment protocols of the 1990s were approved but show no entry into force date: the Colonia Protocol on intra MERCOSUR investments (Law 24.891) and the Buenos Aires Protocol on investments from non member States (Law 24.554). The Intra MERCOSUR Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Protocol (Law 27.527) has been in force since 24 November 2020 (Foreign Ministry record) (unconfirmed).

Two points that surprise investors:

• No BIT with Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay or Japan in force. None of Argentina's MERCOSUR partners has a BIT in force with Argentina in the database, and the Japan agreement is still before Congress (Executive message 207 of 28 November 2019). The Japan text was downloaded but not analysed for this page.
• No BIT with Chile any more. The 1991 Chile BIT ended on 1 May 2019 "in accordance with Annex 8.2 of the Trade Agreement of 2 November 2017" (ficha 1785). Investment protection between Argentina and Chile now depends on that trade agreement (unconfirmed).

3. ICSID Convention (Law 24.353)

Law 24.353 (sanctioned 28 July 1994, promulgated 22 August 1994, BO 2 September 1994) approves the 75 article Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 18 March 1965 (Law 24.353, art. 1). The Foreign Ministry records Argentina's signature on 21 May 1991 and entry into force for Argentina on 18 November 1994.

Key articles for investors:

• Jurisdiction (art. 25(1)). Legal disputes "arising directly out of an investment" between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State that both have consented to in writing. Consent cannot be withdrawn unilaterally. In a BIT, the State's consent is the standing offer in the treaty, and the investor accepts it by filing.
• Nationality (art. 25(2)). A natural person who also has the nationality of the host State is excluded (art. 25(2)(a)). A local company can be treated as a foreign national if the parties so agree because of foreign control (art. 25(2)(b)); Argentina's BITs contain that agreement (for example US BIT art. VII(8); Netherlands BIT art. 10(6)).
• Exclusive remedy and exhaustion (art. 26). Consent to ICSID excludes other remedies unless otherwise stated, and a State "may require the prior exhaustion of its administrative or judicial remedies" as a condition of consent. The 18 month clauses are a softer version of that option.
• No diplomatic protection while the case runs (art. 27), unless the State fails to comply with the award.
• Request and registration (art. 36). The Secretary General registers the request unless the dispute is "manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre".
• Tribunal (arts. 37 and 38). Three arbitrators by default. If the tribunal is not constituted within 90 days after notice of registration, the Chairman of the Administrative Council appoints the missing arbitrators, who cannot be nationals of either party's State.
• Applicable law (art. 42). The law agreed by the parties; failing that, host State law and applicable international law. Most Argentine BITs set their own applicable law clause.
• Post award remedies. Supplementary decision or rectification within 45 days (art. 49(2)); interpretation (art. 50); revision within 90 days of discovery of a decisive new fact and in any event within 3 years (art. 51(2)); annulment within 120 days on five limited grounds, before an ad hoc committee of three (art. 52). There is no appeal (art. 53(1)).
• Recognition and enforcement (art. 54). Every Contracting State must recognise the award as binding and enforce its pecuniary obligations as if it were a final judgment of its own courts, under its rules on execution of judgments (art. 54(1) and (3)).
• Immunity (art. 55). Nothing in art. 54 derogates from the law on immunity from execution of any State. This is why winning and collecting are two different things.
• Costs (arts. 59 to 61). ICSID charges for use of the Centre are set by the Secretary General under schedules adopted by the Administrative Council (art. 59); arbitrators' fees are set within limits fixed by the Council (art. 60); the tribunal decides how costs are borne, and that decision forms part of the award (art. 61(2)). The current ICSID Schedule of Fees is not among the permitted sources.
• Denunciation (arts. 71 and 72). A State may denounce the Convention with effect six months after notice, but consents given before the notice remain effective (art. 72). Argentina has not denounced it (status "in force" per the Foreign Ministry record).

4. Who is a protected investor

The investor definition is the gate. If the holding company is not an "investor" of the treaty partner, nothing else matters. Examples from the treaty texts:

Note the clear trend. The early 1990s treaties look mainly at the place of incorporation or seat; some (Netherlands, France) even protect companies anywhere controlled by their nationals. The 2018 UAE treaty and the 2026 El Salvador treaty require substance and allow benefits to be denied to shell companies and to structures created "with the primary purpose of gaining access" to arbitration (UAE BIT art. 13(c)).

5. Typical protections (with examples of wording)

Fair and equitable treatment (FET) and full protection and security. * US BIT art. II(2)(a): investments "shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law". Art. II(2)(b) adds a ban on arbitrary or discriminatory measures and clarifies that a measure may be arbitrary even if it could be reviewed by local courts. * Netherlands art. 3(1), Spain art. IV(1), Germany art. 2(1), UK art. 2(2), France art. 3: unqualified FET. * UAE art. 5: FET and full protection and security are limited to the customary international law minimum standard, FET is defined around denial of justice, and non discriminatory general welfare measures "shall not be deemed" to breach it (art. 5(2) and (4)). This is a much narrower promise.

Expropriation. * US BIT art. IV(1): no direct or indirect expropriation except for a public purpose, non discriminatory, with "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" equal to fair market value immediately before the measure became known, with interest at a commercially reasonable rate, freely transferable. * Germany art. 4(2): value immediately before the expropriation was made public, paid without delay, with interest at the usual bank rate. * Spain art. V: public utility, non discriminatory, "adequate" compensation in convertible currency without unjustified delay. * Netherlands art. 7: public utility, due process, non discriminatory, not contrary to a specific commitment, "just" compensation equal to the real value.

Free transfer of funds. This is the clause that collides with Argentine FX controls. * US BIT art. V(1) and (2): all transfers related to an investment "freely and without delay", at the market rate on the date of transfer. Each Party may keep reporting requirements and withholding taxes (art. V(3)). * Netherlands art. 6: transfer "without restrictions" of profits, loan payments, royalties, sale proceeds; procedures must not deny, suspend or distort the right. * Spain art. VI and Protocol para. 2: transfers within six months of a proper request, access to the official FX market on the same terms as local companies; balance of payments limits allowed for up to 36 months per investor, with staggering in tranches of up to 18 months; dividends paid with the company's own export proceeds may always be transferred. * UK art. 6(3) and (4): balance of payments limits for up to 18 months per transfer request, with at least 50% of capital and profits transferable by the end of the first year; dividends from export proceeds always transferable. * Switzerland art. 5: staggering for periods of up to 18 months within a maximum of 36 months, at least 50% by the end of the first year. * UAE art. 7(2) and (3): transfers subject to prior fulfilment of local legal requirements; the State may temporarily restrict transfers in case of serious balance of payments difficulties, including exchange controls consistent with the IMF Articles.

Practical consequence: whether a given BCRA restriction breaches a treaty depends on the specific transfer clause. Under the Spain, UK, Switzerland, Italy and Belgium style clauses, temporary balance of payments restrictions are expressly tolerated within time limits; the US and Netherlands clauses contain no such exception, although every treaty is subject to general international law defences (unconfirmed). For the current FX rules see the exchange controls and dividends pages.

National treatment and MFN. * US BIT art. II(1): national and MFN treatment, "whichever is more favourable", subject to sector exceptions in the Protocol. Argentina reserved real estate in border areas, air transport, shipbuilding, nuclear plants, uranium mining, insurance and fishing (Protocol para. 5; the word "mining" was removed by the exchange of notes approved by Law 24.356). * Spain art. IV(2): MFN treatment "in all matters governed by this Agreement". This broad wording has been argued to import more favourable procedural terms (for example to avoid the 18 month rule) from other treaties. The point is contested and tribunals have divided (unconfirmed). * UAE art. 4(5) and (7): MFN does not apply to procedural or jurisdictional matters and cannot be used to import treatment from BITs signed before the UAE treaty entered into force. * Regional integration and tax treaty carve outs are standard (US art. II(9); Netherlands arts. 3(3) and 5; Spain art. IV(3) and (4); Germany art. 3(3) and (4)).

Umbrella clauses (respect for commitments). * US BIT art. II(2)(c): "Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments." * Germany art. 7(2): each Party "shall observe any other obligation it has assumed" with regard to investments. * UK art. 2(2): each Party "shall observe any obligation it may have entered into" with regard to investments. * Netherlands art. 4(2): each Party "shall observe the commitments" assumed regarding investments. * Belgium and Luxembourg (terminated) and Austria art. 8(2): commitments or contractual obligations must be respected. * Spain has no express umbrella clause; art. VII(2) only extends to the investor more favourable rules adopted by law, regulation or contract. * Whether an umbrella clause turns a breach of contract or of a licence into a treaty breach is contested in arbitral practice (unconfirmed). RIGI approvals and stability commitments are the kind of "obligations" an umbrella clause could cover (see section 8).

Taxation. Tax measures are often carved out. The US BIT applies its dispute clauses to tax matters only for expropriation, transfers and investment agreements (art. XII(2)). Netherlands art. 5 gives national and MFN treatment on taxes, but excludes tax treaty advantages.

6. The 18 month local litigation requirement

What it says. In the Germany model (also Spain, Chile, Austria and others), disputes not settled amicably within six months "shall be submitted, at the request of one of the parties, to the competent courts" of the host State, and may go to international arbitration only (a) if there is no decision on the merits after 18 months from the start of the court proceedings, (b) if there is such a decision but the dispute persists, or (c) if both parties agree (Germany BIT art. 10(2) and (3); Spain BIT art. X(2) and (3); Austria BIT art. 9(2) and (3)). The UK and Canada versions use the same 18 months, counted from submission of the dispute to the competent court, plus the option of agreement (UK BIT art. 8(1) and (2); Canada BIT art. X). The Netherlands version allows arbitration if the courts have not issued a "final decision" within 18 months (art. 10(3)); Switzerland, Italy and the former Belgium and Luxembourg treaty count 18 months from notice of the start of court proceedings (Switzerland art. 9(3); Italy art. 8(3); Belgium art. 12(3)).

Which treaties do not have it. * United States: six months after the dispute arose, the investor may consent in writing to ICSID, the ICSID Additional Facility, UNCITRAL or another agreed procedure, provided it has not already gone to local courts or to a previously agreed procedure (US BIT art. VII(2) and (3)). This is a "fork in the road": choosing local courts first forfeits arbitration. * France: after six months the investor chooses either local courts or international arbitration, and the choice is final (France BIT art. 8(2)). * UAE: at least six months after a written request for consultations, which must last at least five months (art. 20(2); art. 21(1)), with a waiver of local proceedings (art. 22) and a three year limitation period from knowledge of the breach (art. 21(7)). If the investor does not file within one year of the consultation request it is deemed to have withdrawn and is barred for the same measures, unless extended by agreement (art. 20(6)).

How tribunals have handled it. Investors have argued that the 18 months are procedural and can be skipped if futile, or that MFN imports a shorter path from the US or France treaty. These arguments have had mixed results (unconfirmed). The safe course is to comply.

What it means in practice. Complying means filing a real lawsuit against the national State in the federal administrative courts, paying the 3% court fee on the amount claimed at filing (Law 23.898, arts. 2, 4(a) and 9), and later discontinuing it. Several treaties require the parties to take steps to stop local proceedings once arbitration starts (Netherlands art. 10(4); Switzerland art. 9(4)). Discontinuance (desistimiento) normally puts court costs on the party that discontinues (CPCCN art. 73). See Example 2 for the numbers.

7. Survival clauses after termination

Every BIT reviewed contains a clause keeping it alive for existing investments after termination. The periods differ a lot:

Three important qualifications:

• Survival can be removed by agreement. When Argentina gave notice to terminate the Indonesia BIT (note of 10 July 2015), it proposed that the survival clause in art. 13(2) "shall have no effect", and Indonesia accepted (note of 14 October 2015). The treaty ended on 14 October 2016 with no survival period (ficha 3527 and the exchange of notes, ficha 10963). Two States can do this for any treaty.
• Replacement treaties shorten survival. The 2026 El Salvador agreement provides that the 1996 BIT terminates when the new one enters into force; the old treaty will apply only to facts before that date, and only if the investor files within three years (Annex, paras. 1 and 2). The new treaty itself has only a two year survival (art. 34(2)).
• Spain counts from denunciation, not termination. Investments made between the notice and the end of the treaty are not covered by the Spanish survival clause (Spain BIT art. XI(3)).

8. RIGI arbitration and how it links to BITs (Law 27.742, arts. 217 and 221 to 223; Decree 749/2024, Annex, arts. 124 to 137)

The commonly cited pointer is confirmed in the text of Law 27.742 and Decree 749/2024:

• Scope. All disputes arising from or related to the RIGI between the national State and an adhered single project vehicle (VPU), including the use, enjoyment, cessation and exercise of rights and incentives (Law 27.742, art. 221).
• Negotiation first. If not settled within 60 calendar days of the VPU's notice, the VPU (or its foreign partners or shareholders, for options (b) and (c)) submits it to arbitration under, at the VPU's choice: (a) the PCA 2012 Arbitration Rules; (b) the ICC Rules (excluding expedited procedure); or (c) the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (art. 221).
• Seat. Except for ICSID Convention arbitration, the seat must be outside Argentina, in a New York Convention State (art. 221).
• Tribunal and language. Three arbitrators, none Argentine or of the nationality of the VPU's majority shareholder's State. Spanish, or Spanish or English for claims by foreign partners under (b) or (c) (art. 221).
• No exhaustion. No prior administrative claim or exhaustion is required, and no expiry period applies to start arbitration; the VPU may withdraw administrative appeals at any time to go to arbitration (art. 217).
• BIT link. RIGI rights and incentives "are considered protected investments" under applicable BITs, and their impairment may give rise to State international responsibility (art. 222). But there is no protected investment under a BIT until the RIGI application and investment plan are approved, and only to the extent of the applicable treaty (Decree 749/2024, Annex, art. 136).
• Arbitration agreement. The VPU must accept these mechanisms, including the RIGI Panel, in writing in the application; the arbitration agreement is perfected on approval and only has effect from the approval act (Annex, art. 128).
• Foreign shareholder definition. A legal person is a "foreign partner or shareholder" only if incorporated outside Argentina and not controlled directly or indirectly by Argentine nationals (Annex, art. 124(f), as amended by Decree 940/2024, BO 22 October 2024). A foreign holding owned by Argentine residents does not get the shareholder options.
• Other rules. Argentine law governs (Annex, art. 131). Each party bears its own costs and the arbitration costs are shared equally, and third party funding must be disclosed (art. 132). The State may counterclaim, and expedited or emergency arbitration needs its express consent (art. 130). RIGI and BIT arbitrations about the same dispute are consolidated with the first one filed; if consolidation is not possible, the RIGI claims of foreign shareholders are discontinued in favour of the BIT claim (art. 135). An optional domestic RIGI Panel of three listed professionals (engineering, economics and at least one lawyer) decides within 60 calendar days of closing, extendable once by 60 days (art. 134). Arbitration does not suspend either side's rights or obligations (Law 27.742, art. 223).

For a RIGI project held through a treaty country, the investor will usually have two routes: the RIGI clause (VPU or its foreign shareholders) and the BIT (the foreign shareholder). The consolidation rule means they cannot run in parallel on the same dispute.

9. Enforcement of awards and Argentina's payment record (factual)

Legal framework. * ICSID awards: binding, no appeal, to be complied with (Convention art. 53), enforceable as final local judgments in all Contracting States (art. 54), subject to immunity from execution (art. 55). * Non ICSID treaty awards (UNCITRAL, ICSID Additional Facility, PCA, ICC): enforced under the New York Convention. Several BITs require such arbitrations to be seated in a New York Convention State (US BIT art. VII(5)) and treat the consent as an "agreement in writing" under art. II of that Convention (US BIT art. VII(4)(b)). In Argentina, the New York Convention was approved by Law 23.619 with declarations; see the Arbitration page. * Most BITs say awards are "final and binding" and the State will comply (US BIT art. VII(6); Spain art. X(6): "each Party shall execute it in accordance with its legislation").

The official record of settlements. The following facts come from norms published in the Boletín Oficial and held on Infoleg:

What this record shows, and what it does not:

• It shows a consistent pattern: final awards were settled, not paid in cash at face value; the State paid in its own bonds, with discounts, against full waivers, after certification of the award amounts by the Treasury Attorney's Office (Procuración del Tesoro) and the General Audit Office (SIGEN).
• It shows that awards were assigned to third parties before settlement (the 2013 and 2016 resolutions name assignees as current holders). A market for awards against Argentina has existed.
• It shows that a claim can be withdrawn as part of a contract renegotiation and that the renegotiation can later be attacked. Decree 633/2022 records that a concessionaire had filed ICSID case ARB/15/48 claiming USD 1,135,000,000 and USD 1,793,000,000 for two motorway concessions, withdrew it in August 2018 after the 2018 renegotiation, and the tribunal recorded the discontinuance; Decree 633/2022 then declared the 2018 renegotiation decrees harmful to the public interest (lesivos) for alleged legitimacy defects.
• It does not show the current stock of unpaid awards, enforcement actions abroad, attachment attempts, or the government's current policy on paying awards (unconfirmed).

Step by step

A. Before investing: structure for protection

1. Map the treaties. List the countries where your group has, or could have, a real holding company, and check Table 1. Exclude countries in Tables 2 and 3.
2. Read the investor definition of each candidate treaty (section 4). Check incorporation, seat, effective management, substantial business activities and control tests. Check whether your ultimate owners are Argentine nationals or residents, which several treaties and the RIGI regulation exclude (UAE art. 1; Decree 749/2024 Annex art. 124(f)).
3. Check the investment definition. The Netherlands and Spain treaties protect assets invested "in accordance with" Argentine law (NL art. 1(a); Spain art. I(2)). Non compliance with Argentine registration rules can be raised against you. The UAE treaty excludes sovereign debt, bonds, purely commercial claims and, for Argentina, natural resource concessions (art. 1).
4. Compare the protections you care about (FX transfers, umbrella clause, expropriation standard) and the dispute path (18 month rule or not). Use Example 1.
5. Build substance in the holding country (management, board meetings, staff, bank accounts, decisions) and document it. Treaties with substance tests or denial of benefits clauses will be applied at the time of the dispute (UAE art. 13).
6. Set up the chain early. Make the investment through the treaty company from the start, or restructure long before any dispute is foreseeable. The UAE treaty denies benefits to structures created with the primary purpose of gaining access to arbitration (art. 13(c)); older treaties do not apply to disputes that arose before their entry into force (NL art. 11; Spain art. II(2)). Restructuring after a dispute has arisen is high risk under all treaties (unconfirmed).
7. Register the investment correctly in Argentina: foreign shareholder registration of the holding company with IGJ or the provincial registry, and FX inflow and reporting under BCRA rules (see the entities and FX pages, and Foreign investment regime). Good records make it easier to prove an "investment" later.
8. RIGI projects: include the written acceptance of the RIGI dispute mechanisms in the application (Decree 749/2024 Annex art. 128) and note that BIT protection of RIGI rights starts only from approval (art. 136).

B. When a dispute arises

1. Preserve evidence and calculate damages early (valuation date issues are central in expropriation claims).
2. Send a written notice of dispute to the Argentine State, invoking the treaty and requesting amicable consultations. For RIGI, notify the enforcement authority with copy to the Treasury Attorney's Office (Decree 749/2024 Annex art. 125). Note the date: it starts the treaty periods (for example 6 months in Spain art. X(2)).
3. Decide the route. Under the US treaty, do not go to local courts if you want arbitration (fork in the road, art. VII(3)). Under the France treaty, the choice is final (art. 8(2)). Under 18 month treaties, plan the local lawsuit.
4. If the 18 month rule applies, file a claim against the national State in the federal administrative courts (Contencioso Administrativo Federal) (unconfirmed), pay the 3% court fee (Law 23.898 arts. 2 and 9), and diarise 18 months from the start of the proceedings.
5. After the waiting period, notify the choice of arbitration and try to agree the forum; under Spain, Germany and similar treaties, ICSID applies by default after 3 months without agreement (Spain art. X(4)).
6. File the ICSID request with the Secretary General, showing the treaty consent and investor status (ICSID art. 36). Pay the lodging fee (unconfirmed).
7. Discontinue the local proceedings as required by the treaty (NL art. 10(4); Switzerland art. 9(4)) and manage the cost exposure (CPCCN art. 73).
8. Constitute the tribunal within 90 days of registration, or request appointments by the Chairman (ICSID art. 38).
9. After the award, monitor the 45, 120 day and 3 year windows (arts. 49, 51, 52). If annulment is requested, ask whether enforcement is stayed (unconfirmed).
10. Enforcement and settlement: present a certified copy of the award to the competent court where you seek enforcement (art. 54(2)); in practice, expect negotiations with the Ministry of Economy, certification by the Treasury Attorney's Office and SIGEN, and payment in bonds (payment record table).

Who files: the foreign investor (and, under some treaties, on behalf of the local company; UAE art. 21(1)(b)). Online or paper: ICSID accepts electronic filing (unconfirmed); Argentine federal court claims are filed electronically through the judiciary's system (unconfirmed). Time: see Example 2. Cost: see Example 2.

Costs and timelines

Table 1. BITs in force (Foreign Ministry record, 26 October 2026)

BO dates are the Infoleg publication dates of the approving laws. "EIF" is entry into force per the ficha.

Also in force and relevant: two interpretative exchanges of notes to the Panama BIT (15 September and 19 October 2004; fichas 7584 and 7585) and the exchange of notes amending the Chile treaty (now irrelevant since the treaty ended). The status of the Venezuela BIT is recorded as "Vigente" with no denunciation.

Table 2. Terminated BITs

The end dates in the last column are calculations from the treaty text and the ficha dates; the start date of the survival period (termination date versus date the notice took effect) can be argued in some texts (unconfirmed).

Table 3. Signed but not in force

Table 4. Dispute settlement clauses compared

Table 5. Deadlines

Table 6. Timeline of norms

BO dates of the resolutions are the Infoleg publication dates shown in the CIADI search results; the norms' own dates are given in the payment record table above.

Worked examples

All peso conversions use the dólar MEP rate of ARS 1,563.90 per US$ on 23 October 2026, as given in some secondary summaries (unconfirmed). Hypothetical inputs are illustrations, not market data.

Example 1: choosing between a Dutch and a Spanish holding company

A European group will invest USD 50,000,000 (ARS 78,195,000,000) of equity in an Argentine SA that will hold a regulated concession. It can hold the shares through an existing Dutch BV or an existing Spanish SL. It asks which treaty gives better protection. Tax is analysed separately on the Tax treaties page (both countries have income tax treaties with Argentina: Netherlands approved by Law 24.933; Spain by Law 26.918).

Step 1: decision table (treaty texts).

Step 2: worst case dates if Argentina denounced each treaty at the earliest possible moment.

• Netherlands: entry into force 1 October 1994; 10 year periods end 1 October 2004, 2014, 2024 and next on 1 October 2034. Notice must be given at least six months before, by 1 April 2034. Survival 15 years from expiry: existing investments protected until 1 October 2049. That is 23 years from today.
• Spain: entry into force 28 September 1992; initial term to 28 September 2002, then two year renewals: 2004, 2006 and so on; the current period runs from 28 September 2026 to 28 September 2028. Notice by 28 March 2028; termination 28 September 2028; survival 10 years: protection until 28 September 2038. That is 12 years from today, and investments made after the notice would not be covered.

Step 3: what is at stake in pesos. If the concession were expropriated in 2040, the Dutch BV would still have a treaty claim for the full investment; the Spanish SL might have none if Spain's treaty had been denounced in 2028. On the USD 50,000,000 investment, that is ARS 78,195,000,000 of capital whose treaty protection depends on the choice.

Conclusion for this investor: the Dutch BV is the stronger vehicle if it has real economic activities and effective management in the Netherlands. If the BV is a mailbox company, the Spanish SL with a genuine seat may be safer on jurisdiction, at the cost of weaker transfer and umbrella protection. In both cases the 18 month local litigation phase applies. This conclusion is based only on the treaty texts; arbitral interpretations of "real economic activities" and "seat" are not among the sources (unconfirmed).

Example 2: timeline and cost of a treaty claim under the Spain BIT

A Spanish company claims USD 20,000,000 (ARS 31,278,000,000) for measures that destroyed the value of its Argentine subsidiary. It sends its notice of dispute on 2 November 2026.

Step 1: timeline (treaty and ICSID Convention).

Realistic total: about 5.5 years to an award and about 8 years to a final, unannulled award, before collection. The local litigation phase alone adds 18 months plus the 6 month amicable period.

Step 2: cost of the local litigation phase (Argentine statutes).

1. Court fee (tasa de justicia). 3% of the amount claimed, including interest claimed, converted into pesos at the exchange rate in force when the fee is paid (Law 23.898, arts. 2 and 4(a)), payable by the plaintiff at filing (art. 9(a)).
2. ARS 31,278,000,000 × 3% = ARS 938,340,000 (USD 600,000).
3. The 50% reduction for direct appeals against government resolutions (art. 3(g)) would cut this to ARS 469,170,000 (USD 300,000), but an ordinary damages claim is probably not a "direct appeal" (unconfirmed). Which exchange rate the court uses ("al cambio vigente") is also a point to check (unconfirmed).
4. If the fee is ordered and not paid within 5 days, a fine of 50% of the omitted fee applies (art. 11): another ARS 469,170,000 (USD 300,000).
5. The fee forms part of the costs and is borne in the end in the proportion in which costs are imposed (art. 10).
6. Exposure to the State's lawyers' fees on discontinuance. If the claimant discontinues the court case to go to arbitration, costs are in principle borne by the party that discontinues (CPCCN art. 73). Under the fee law, fees for each party's lawyers in a claim of more than 751 UMA are 12% to 15% of the amount (Law 27.423, art. 21). With the UMA at ARS 108,005 from 1 September 2026 (Supreme Court notice), the claim equals about 289,598 UMA.
7. 12% × ARS 31,278,000,000 = ARS 3,753,360,000 (USD 2,400,000).
8. 15% × ARS 31,278,000,000 = ARS 4,691,700,000 (USD 3,000,000).
9. These are the scale figures for a full proceeding. Reductions for early termination stages and the 25% overall cap on costs liability (CCyC art. 730, which refers to the amount of the "judgment, award, settlement" ending the dispute) may reduce them substantially; how a court would regulate fees on a discontinued treaty related claim is uncertain (unconfirmed).
10. Own counsel in Argentina: market rates, not regulated by any source (unconfirmed).

Step 3: cost of the arbitration (ICSID).

Cost to do it (summary): court fee of about ARS 938,340,000 (USD 600,000) at filing in Argentina, potential exposure of up to ARS 3,753,360,000 to 4,691,700,000 (USD 2,400,000 to 3,000,000) for the State's regulated legal fees if the local claim is discontinued (subject to the caps and reductions noted), ICSID fees per the official schedule (unconfirmed), and own counsel and experts. Time: 2 years before arbitration can start, about 5.5 years to an award, about 8 years with annulment. Capital: none required by law, but the claimant must fund the case or disclose third party funding where required (the UAE BIT art. 24 and the RIGI regulation art. 132 have funding disclosure rules).

Compare with the US BIT route for a US investor with the same claim: arbitration can start 6 months after the dispute arose (art. VII(3)(a)), with no Argentine court fee because no local claim is filed (and filing one would forfeit arbitration). That saves about 18 months and the ARS 938,340,000 fee.

Example 3: what a settled award was worth (Suez and Engie, 2019)

This example uses only the figures in the official norms.

1. Award principal: USD 404,539,050 plus interest (Joint Res. 29/2019, recitals). At the 23 Oct 2026 dólar MEP rate, the principal is ARS 632,658,620,295 (USD 404,539,050 × 1,563.90).
2. Bonds authorised for the settlement: up to VNO USD 105,000,000 of DICA 8.28% 2033 and up to VNO USD 275,000,000 of BONAR 2024 (Joint Res. 29/2019, arts. 1 and 2). Total maximum nominal value: USD 380,000,000 (ARS 594,282,000,000).
3. Nominal recovery against principal alone: 380,000,000 ÷ 404,539,050 = 93.9% of principal, before any interest. Since the award also carried interest, the recovery against the full award was lower than 93.9%; the exact interest amount is not stated in the norms reviewed (unconfirmed).
4. Market value: the creditor received bonds, not cash. Their market value at delivery depended on bond prices on that date, which are not in the sources (unconfirmed). The State also waived its own claims against the investors and the former concessionaire (Decree 239/2019, art. 1), which has value to the creditor.
5. Lesson: in modelling an award against Argentina, an investor should apply (a) a discount on face value (the 2013 and 2016 models required at least 25% off the total claimed including interest), (b) payment in Argentine law bonds, and (c) the time to negotiate (award of 9 April 2015, settlement norms in March to May 2019: about four years).

Example 4: is my investment still protected under a terminated treaty?

A South African group invested USD 8,000,000 (ARS 12,511,200,000) in an Argentine winery in 2012. In October 2026 it suffers a measure it considers expropriatory.

1. The South Africa BIT was denounced by South Africa on 31 March 2016 and terminated on 1 April 2017 (ficha 4097).
2. For investments made before the termination notice took effect, arts. 1 to 9 remain in force for 15 years from that date (final article, para. 2). 1 April 2017 + 15 years = 1 April 2032.
3. The 2012 investment was made before termination, so substantive protections apply to a 2026 measure. But the survival clause covers arts. 1 to 9 only: whether the investor State arbitration article is among them must be checked in the numbering of the text (unconfirmed). If the arbitration clause is outside arts. 1 to 9, the investor may have substantive rights without direct access to arbitration.
4. A Chilean investor in the same position would need to check the 2017 Trade Agreement (Annex 8.2) (unconfirmed); an Indonesian investor has no survival protection at all after 14 October 2016.

Practical traps

• Using the wrong list. Commercial databases often show signed treaties as if in force. Only the Foreign Ministry ficha confirms entry into force and termination. Greece and New Zealand were approved by Congress but never entered into force.
• The fork in the road. Under the US BIT, filing in Argentine courts first (for example to get an injunction) can forfeit arbitration (art. VII(3)(a)). Under the France BIT, the first choice is final (art. 8(2)). Take arbitration advice before any local filing.
• Assuming the 18 months can be skipped. MFN and futility arguments are contested. Under an 18 month treaty, file the local claim early so the clock starts.
• Court fee shock. The 3% court fee on a dollar claim converted into pesos at filing is substantial (Example 2), and discontinuance can expose the claimant to the State's fees (CPCCN art. 73).
• Late restructuring. Moving shares into a treaty company once a dispute is foreseeable invites a jurisdictional objection. Newer treaties deny benefits for restructurings aimed at arbitration (UAE art. 13(c)).
• Argentine owners. Foreign holding companies controlled by Argentine nationals are excluded under the UAE BIT (art. 1) and from the RIGI "foreign shareholder" options (Decree 749/2024 Annex art. 124(f)). Older treaties may still protect them, but host State nationality issues are contested (unconfirmed).
• Dual nationals. A natural person with Argentine nationality cannot bring an ICSID claim against Argentina (ICSID art. 25(2)(a)). Most BITs also exclude nationals of the partner State domiciled in Argentina for more than two years at the time of investment (for example Germany Protocol (a); UK art. 8(5); NL Protocol (a)).
• Investments must be lawful. "In accordance with the laws" language (NL art. 1(a); Spain art. I(2)) lets the State argue that an irregular investment is not protected. Keep IGJ, BCRA and tax filings clean.
• Transfer clauses are not FX exemptions. Banks apply BCRA rules regardless of treaty wording. A treaty gives a damages claim, not access to the FX market. Several treaties expressly allow balance of payments restrictions within time limits (Spain, UK, Switzerland, Italy, UAE).
• Short survival in new treaties. The UAE treaty survives only two years (art. 44(2)) and the 2026 El Salvador treaty two years, plus a three year filing window for claims under the old treaty (Annex para. 2).
• Survival can be cancelled. Indonesia shows that both States can agree to remove the survival clause. Investors have no veto.
• Waiver and settlements. Settlements of awards required full waivers of rights from the investment and the award (Res. 598/2013; Res. 173/2016). A renegotiation that includes discontinuing an ICSID case can later be challenged by a new government (Decree 633/2022).
• Collection risk. ICSID art. 55 preserves immunity from execution. Collection has historically meant negotiated settlements in bonds.
• RIGI double track. RIGI and BIT claims on the same dispute are consolidated, and the RIGI claims of foreign shareholders may be discontinued in favour of the BIT claim (Decree 749/2024 Annex art. 135). Plan one strategy.
• Tax disputes. Many BITs limit arbitration of tax measures (US BIT art. XII(2)). Tax disputes generally go through domestic procedures and the tax treaty mutual agreement procedure (see Tax treaties).

Recent changes

• 22 September 2026: new Argentina El Salvador investment agreement signed in New York (ficha 12101): 5 year initial term, two year survival, temporary safeguard measures on transfers and capital movements (art. 20), denial of benefits (art. 12), and an annex terminating the 1996 BIT on entry into force with a three year window for claims under the old treaty. Not yet in force.
• 31 October 2024: the UAE BIT entered into force (ficha 11452), the first new Argentine BIT in force since 2010 (Senegal). It reflects a much narrower modern model: FET tied to the customary minimum standard, MFN excluding procedure, waiver of local remedies, three year limitation period, two year survival, third party funding rules.
• 21 October 2024: Law 27.779 approving the UAE BIT published in the BO.
• 22 October 2024: Decree 940/2024 amended the RIGI regulation, including the definitions in Annex art. 124 (foreign shareholder excludes companies controlled by Argentine nationals).
• 23 August 2024: Decree 749/2024 regulated RIGI dispute resolution: arbitration agreement perfected on approval, RIGI Panel, consolidation with BIT claims, cost sharing and funding disclosure, BIT protection only from approval (Annex arts. 124 to 137).
• 8 July 2024: Law 27.742 created the RIGI with international arbitration (PCA, ICC, ICSID) and deemed RIGI rights protected investments under applicable BITs (arts. 221 and 222).
• 15 September 2022: Decree 633/2022 declared the 2018 motorway renegotiation decrees harmful, reciting the withdrawn ICSID case ARB/15/48.
• 1 February 2021: the Nicaragua BIT ended (ficha 2447).
• 1 May 2019: the Chile BIT ended under Annex 8.2 of the 2017 Trade Agreement (ficha 1785).
• March to May 2019: settlement of the Suez (Engie) award in bonds (Decree 239/2019; Res. MH 241/2019; Joint Res. 29/2019).

Pending changes

• Japan (signed 1 December 2018) and Qatar (signed 6 November 2016) BITs are still before Congress (Executive messages 207/2019 and 174/2018). Their entry into force would add two new generation treaties (unconfirmed).
• El Salvador 2026 agreement: needs congressional approval and exchange of notifications (art. 33).
• Greece, New Zealand and Dominican Republic treaties: signed decades ago, not in force; no sign of activity in the record.
• MERCOSUR Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols: approved by Argentina but no entry into force recorded (unconfirmed).
• Chile: the investment rules of the 2017 Trade Agreement and Annex 8.2 need to be added to this page (unconfirmed).
• Policy direction: the 2018 UAE and 2026 El Salvador texts suggest Argentina's current model is narrower than its 1990s treaties. Whether Argentina will renegotiate or denounce older treaties is not stated in any official source reviewed. Watch the Foreign Ministry database for denunciation notices: under 2 year renewal treaties (Spain, Switzerland), the next renewal dates are close (Spain 28 September 2028; Switzerland 6 November 2028, after the period that started on 6 November 2026).
• ICSID fees and rules: the current ICSID Schedule of Fees and Arbitration Rules must be checked on the official ICSID site, which is outside the permitted download domains (unconfirmed).
• Unpaid awards and enforcement litigation: no official Argentine source on the current stock was found (unconfirmed).

FAQ

1. Does my country have a BIT in force with Argentina? Check Table 1, which reproduces the Foreign Ministry record as of 26 October 2026: 48 treaties are in force. Note that Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Japan are not on it, Chile's treaty ended in 2019, and signed treaties with Greece, New Zealand, the Dominican Republic, Qatar, Japan and the 2026 El Salvador agreement are not in force.

2. I am a US investor. Do I have to sue in Argentine courts first? No. Under the US BIT, six months after the dispute arose you can consent in writing to ICSID, the Additional Facility, UNCITRAL or another agreed procedure (art. VII(3)). But if you first submit the dispute to Argentine courts or a previously agreed procedure, you lose the arbitration option (art. VII(2) and (3)).

3. What is the 18 month rule and how much does it cost? Under many treaties (Germany, Spain, UK, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Canada, Austria and others) the investor must first litigate in Argentine courts and may go to international arbitration if there is no decision after 18 months, or the dispute persists after a decision. On a USD 20 million claim, the 3% court fee alone is about ARS 938 million (USD 600,000) at the 23 Oct 2026 dólar MEP rate (Example 2).

4. Can I use the MFN clause to avoid the 18 months? Possibly under broad MFN clauses such as Spain art. IV(2) ("all matters governed by this Agreement"), but tribunals have disagreed and the point is contested. Newer treaties expressly exclude procedural MFN (UAE art. 4(5)). Do not rely on it without specialist advice.

5. Can I set up a holding company in a treaty country to get protection? Yes, if the company meets the treaty's investor definition and the structure is in place before a dispute is foreseeable. Old treaties often look at incorporation or seat; the Netherlands and Switzerland treaties require real economic activities; the UAE treaty requires substantial business activities and denies benefits to structures created to access arbitration (Example 1; section 4).

6. Our BIT was terminated. Are we still protected? Usually yes for investments made before termination, for 10 or 15 years depending on the treaty (Table 2). Exceptions: Indonesia (survival removed by agreement), Belgium and Luxembourg (survival lapsed in May 2024) and Chile (rules of the 2017 Trade Agreement apply). Investments made after termination are not covered.

7. Does a RIGI project get treaty protection? RIGI rights and incentives are deemed protected investments under applicable BITs (Law 27.742, art. 222), but only from approval of the application and investment plan, and only to the extent of the applicable treaty (Decree 749/2024 Annex art. 136). RIGI also has its own arbitration clause (art. 221). Claims on the same dispute under both are consolidated (Annex art. 135).

8. Will Argentina pay an ICSID award? Legally it must comply (ICSID arts. 53 and 54). Factually, the official norms show that Argentina settled several awards in 2013, 2016, 2017 and 2019 by agreements paid in government bonds, with discounts of at least 25% on amounts claimed including interest in the 2013 and 2016 models, and full waivers (payment record table). ICSID art. 55 preserves immunity from execution, which limits forced collection.

9. Can I enforce an ICSID award against Argentine assets abroad? Art. 54 requires all ICSID States to enforce the pecuniary obligations as a final local judgment, but each State's immunity law applies (art. 55). Assets used for sovereign purposes are typically immune (unconfirmed).

10. Can I sell my claim or award? The official settlement norms name assignees as holders of several awards (for example the 2013 and 2016 resolutions), so awards have been transferred. Whether a treaty claim can be assigned before an award, and with what effect on jurisdiction, depends on the treaty and is contested (unconfirmed).

11. Does the Foreign Investment Law 21.382 give arbitration rights? No. The FIL has no international arbitration clause and no stability promise. Arbitration rights come from BITs, the ICSID Convention, RIGI (Law 27.742 art. 221) or a contract. See Foreign investment regime.

12. Are taxes covered by BIT protection? Often only partly. The US BIT applies its dispute clauses to tax matters only regarding expropriation, transfers and investment agreements (art. XII(2)). Several treaties carve out tax treaty advantages from MFN (Netherlands art. 5; Spain art. IV(4); Germany art. 3(4)).

Primary sources

• Search of bilateral treaties with "inversiones" in the title (122 results)
• Record sheets (*fichas*) of each BIT, URL pattern
• ICSID Convention record (in force for Argentina 18 November 1994)
• Treaty texts from the Foreign Ministry (PDF): UAE (El Salvador 2026 (Japan (Qatar (Indonesia termination notes (via
• Law 24.124 (US BIT)
• Law 24.356 (US exchange of notes)
• Law 24.352 (Netherlands BIT)
• Law 24.118 (Spain BIT)
• Law 24.184 (UK BIT)
• Law 24.098 (Germany BIT)
• Law 24.099 (Switzerland BIT)
• Law 24.100 (France BIT)
• Law 24.122 (Italy BIT)
• Law 24.123 (Belgium and Luxembourg BIT)
• Law 24.125 (Canada BIT)
• Law 24.328 (Austria BIT)
• Law 24.342 (Chile BIT)
• Law 24.458 (Bolivia BIT)
• Law 24.459 (Ecuador BIT)
• Law 24.814 (Indonesia BIT)
• Law 25.351 (Nicaragua BIT)
• Law 25.352 (South Africa BIT)
• Law 25.540 (India BIT)
• Law 27.779 (UAE BIT) and annex
• Infoleg search pages used to list all BIT approving laws
• Law 24.353
• Law 27.742, arts. 217 and 221 to 223
• Decree 749/2024, Annex arts. 124 to 137, as amended by Decree 940/2024
• Res. MEyFP 598/2013
• Res. MHyFP 173/2016
• Res. MF 112-E/2017
• Res. MF 241-E/2017
• Decree 239/2019
• Res. MH 241/2019
• Joint Res. SH and SF 29/2019
• Decree 633/2022
• Infoleg search for "CIADI"
• Supreme Court notice of the UMA value (ARS 108,005 from 1 September 2026)

Related pages

• Arbitration
• RIGI
• Foreign investment regime: Law 21.382
• Tax treaties
• Restricted sectors and limits on foreign investment in Argentina
• RIMI: Argentina's incentive regime for medium investments
• Are there restrictions on foreign investment in Argentina?
• What is the RIGI and who qualifies?
• RIGI approved projects tracker